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WORKER OWNERSHIP THROUGH 401(K)
RETIREMENT PLANS:
ENRON'S CAUTIONARY TALE
DAVID MILLONt
INTRODUCTION
Peter Drucker coined the term "pension fund socialism" in
1976 to draw attention to the increasingly large percentage of
United States equity capital owned by pension funds and other
large institutional investors.' He was concerned with the
implications of this phenomenon for corporate governance. He
believed that these changes in the distribution of share
ownership meant the final erosion of managerial accountability.
Pension fund managers, focused solely on investment return,
had no interest in monitoring the performance of corporate
management. This development, he wrote, "makes final the
divorce of traditional 'ownership' from 'control.' "2
Today, of course, pension funds and other large institutions
own an even larger portion of the stock of our nation's largest
corporations-over half of outstanding shares. 3 For some well-
t Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and J.B. Stombock Professor of Law,
Washington and Lee University. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments
and suggestions of Maureen Cavanaugh and Susan Stabile and expresses his
appreciation for the opportunity to have participated in the Symposium: Enron and
Its Aftermath, St. John's University School of Law, Jamaica, New York (Sept. 20,
2002).
1 PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: How PENSION FUND
SOCIALISM CAME TO AMERICA 47 (1976) [hereinafter THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION].
This work was reissued with a new introduction and epilogue in 1995. See PETER F.
DRUCKER, THE PENSION FUND REVOLUTION (1996).
2 PENSION FUND REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 82 (italics in original). The
reference to separation between ownership and control echoes Berle and Means'
highly influential analysis of the governance implications of broadly dispersed share
ownership in public corporations. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
3 See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 624
(7th ed. 2001) (noting that, as of 1992,. institutions owned over half of the
outstanding shares of New York Stock Exchange listed companies).
835
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
known companies, aggregate institutional shareholdings can
reach eighty or even ninety percent of outstanding shares. 4
Drucker's governance concerns are thus amplified. One result
has been a flurry of academic debate over the possibility and
desirability of "institutional investor activism" as a mechanism
for enhancing management accountability to shareholders. 5
Drucker used the term "socialism" to highlight the fact that
large-scale stock ownership by pension funds has effectively
turned workers into owners of America's largest corporations. 6
Both private pension funds of large corporations and state-run
pension systems manage trillions of dollars for the benefit of
private and public-sector employees. The assets of these plans
are heavily invested in publicly traded stock, so their
beneficiaries can claim to own, at least indirectly, a large
percentage of a significant sector of the means of production in
this country.
Drucker's primary concern focused on the implications of
this phenomenon for the accountability of corporate management
to investors; consequently, he did not elaborate on the political
implications of his use of the term "socialism." In this Article, I
wish to point out a different dimension of the pension fund
socialism idea. The proliferation of employer-sponsored pension
plans in the private sector has transformed workers into owners
of stock in their own companies. This is because the increasingly
dominant form of pension plan-the so-called 401(k) plan-
allows, and in many cases encourages, workers to invest their
retirement savings in company stock.7
Advocates of worker ownership have long touted its
4 See id. at 625.
5 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 520, 530-64 (1990) (discussing legal obstacles to institutional shareholder
activism). See generally Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in
Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993) (questioning
possibilities for significant institutional involvement in corporate governance).
6 See THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 2 ("[Alside from farming, a
larger sector of the American economy is owned today by the American worker
through his investment agent, the pension fund... than Castro's Cuba has actually
nationalized, or than had been nationalized in Hungary or Poland at the height of
Stalinism.").
7 For yet another meaning of the term "pension fund socialism," see William H.
Simon, The Prospects of Pension Fund Socialism, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
251, 254-59 (1993) (using term to refer to investment of pension fund assets to
promote socially responsible corporate activity).
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superiority to investor ownership as a system for the
organization of production. They continue to speak from both
ends of the political spectrum. Enron illustrates the serious
risks to employees of excessive 401(k) investment in company
stock. The Enron disaster has led to proposals to strictly limit,
or even forbid altogether, worker investment in their own
corporation's shares. Before endorsing those proposals, however,
I suggest it may be useful to review the principal arguments that
have been advanced in favor of worker ownership. Because
401(k) pension plans are increasingly common and, as a practical
matter, the most effective method for promotion of worker
ownership, reform proposals that would curtail or eliminate this
possibility should be evaluated in light of the potential benefits
of worker ownership. After a review of ways in which 401(k)
pension plans can facilitate workers' ownership of their own
corporations, this Article discusses pension disasters at Enron
and other companies and then reviews the principal arguments
in favor of worker ownership. The Article concludes that none of
these arguments is weighty enough to overcome Enron's lesson.
I. WORKER OWNERSHIP THROUGH 401(K) PLANS
A. The Current Pension Landscape
Under current law, there is a basic distinction between two
fundamentally different kinds of pension plans. These are the
so-called "defined-benefit" plans on the one hand and the
"defined-contribution" plans on the other.
Defined-benefit plans are funded by the employer and
commit the employer to pay the employee a defined pension
benefit upon retirement.8 The employer determines the amount
of its future pension obligations and sets aside the funds needed
to meet those obligations. A qualified professional decides how
these assets should be invested so as to generate the necessary
returns.
In contrast, defined-contribution plans rely on contributions
from employees. 9 Employees contribute their own money-often
8 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2001) (defining "defined benefit plan"). Defined-
benefit and defined-contribution pension plans are regulated primarily through the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
9 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2001) (defining "defined contribution plan").
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supplemented by a matching contribution from the employer-to
a pension trust. Employee and employer contributions are then
allocated to employees' individual accounts. In most defined-
contribution plans, the employees decide how their contributions
should be invested. They may also be able to make similar
choices with regard to the employer's match.
In recent years, there has been a clear trend toward
establishing defined-contribution plans and away from creation
of defined-benefit plans. 10  Defined-contribution plans now
dominate the pension landscape. They account for over eighty
percent of all pension plans and cover over sixty percent of plan
participants.1' Some companies maintain both defined-benefit
and defined-contribution plans (including Enron), but for
increasing numbers of employees, defined-contribution plans are
either their sole or primary source of retirement security.
This development is important because defined-benefit and
defined-contribution plans differ in how they allocate investment
risk. Under a defined-benefit plan, the employer obligates itself
to a defined payout. If it sets aside insufficient funds or if those
funds are invested in securities that do not perform as well as
expected, the employer may find itself unable to meet its
obligations to its retirees. The employer therefore bears the risk
of its own funding and investment decisions. 12 In contrast, the
employee's pension benefit under a defined-contribution plan
depends on the value created by his or her own savings and
investment choices. Bad decisions can yield inadequate
retirement benefits.
The 401(k) plan is the most common type of defined-
contribution pension plan. It is named for the Internal Revenue
Code provision that allows employees to defer income taxation on
contributions to qualified pension plans. 13 As the most common
10 See Retirement Security and Defined Contribution Pension Plans: The Role of
Company Stock in 401(k) Plans: Hearing Before the Senate Fin. Comm., 107th Cong.
2 (2002) (statement of Jack L. VanDerhei) (commenting that, in the twenty years
after 1978, the percentage of active participants decreased by approximately one-
half).
11 See Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan
Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 74 (2002) (noting that such high percentages
amount to the participation of roughly forty million employees nationwide).
12 Under certain circumstances, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation,
established by ERISA, guarantees payment of pension benefits to retirees whose
employer's plan is under-funded. See 29 U.S.C. § 1305 (2001).
13 See 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2001).
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form of defined-contribution plan, the 401(k) is therefore the
primary vehicle for retirement security in this country.
Approximately forty million Americans participate in such
plans.14
B. Company Stock in Defined-Contribution Plans
The typical defined-contribution plan presents the employee
with a menu of diversified mutual fund and other investment
options selected by the employer. These options can include the
employer's own stock, an option that is more likely in larger
corporations than in smaller ones.15 The employer's matching
contribution can also take the form of company stock. Under
some plans (including Enron's), this is the only option. When
employers contribute company stock, typically the employee will
be forbidden from selling those shares and reinvesting the
proceeds until he or she reaches a defined age, often fifty, fifty-
five, or sixty. At Enron, the age was fifty. 16
ERISA prohibits defined-benefit plans from holding more
than ten percent of plan assets in company stock.17 No such
statutory limits apply to defined-contribution plans, either in the
aggregate or as to individual employee accounts. For all plans
offering company stock as an option, the average amount of plan
assets allocated to that investment option is nearly forty-two
percent.'8 At a number of companies, however, the percentage of
401(k) assets invested in company stock is even higher. At
Enron, it was nearly two-thirds. 19 At a number of other well-
known companies, the percentage is quite a bit higher. For
14 Stabile, supra note 11, at 74.
15 See Jack L. VanDerhei, Company Stock in 401(k) Plans: Results of a Survey
of ISCEBS Members, at 5 (Employee Benefit Research Institute Special Report)
(Jan. 31, 2002) (reporting that 49% of large plans compared to 36% of small plans
mandate employer contributions be invested in the company's own stock), at
http://www.ebri.org/pdfs/iscebs.pdf.
16 See ENRON CORP. SAVINGS PLAN, at V-1.
17 See 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (2001). Specifically, the statute requires a plan not
to "acquire any qualifying employer security or qualifying employer real property" if
doing so would cause "the aggregate fair market value of employer [assets] held by
the plan [to] exceed[ 10 percent of the fair market value of the assets of the plan."
18 Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in
Defined Contribution Savings Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79, 90 (2001).
19 Patrick J. Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement
Plans, at 3 (CRS Report for Congress) (Jan. 22, 2002), at http://www.house.gov/
boozman/ issues/crsrsenron.pdf.
2002]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
example, at Proctor & Gamble, the figure is 91.5%.2o Other
examples include Abbott Laboratories, 80%; Pfizer, 74.8%;
Anheuser-Busch and Coca-Cola, each around 82%; and General
Electric, 77%.21
These being aggregate numbers, at these companies (and at
many others), an individual employee's holding of company stock
as a percentage of his or her retirement portfolio could be even
higher. Clearly, many employees are not following prudent
diversification strategies, choosing instead to put all or most of
their pension eggs in a single basket. Apparently, low wage
workers are especially likely to over-invest in company stock.22
In some cases, over-investment may simply result from
management's encouragement. At Enron, for example, in
August 2001, CEO Ken Lay told employees, "Now is the time to
buy Enron shares" 23 and, in September, he reiterated that the
stock was a great bargain.24 Meanwhile, Lay himself sold shares
worth twenty million dollars during the same period, without
disclosure.25 It is also possible that employees respond to real or
perceived pressure to buy company stock as a signal of their
loyalty to the firm.26
One study indicates that workers tend to extrapolate
excessively from a company's past performance to unrealistic
expectations about its future.27  Over-investment, therefore,
would be especially likely at a company like Enron that had
experienced dramatic increases in share prices.
While 401(k) plans are providing a vehicle for worker
20 Id. at 4.
21 Id.
22 See Gordon P. Goodfellow & Sylvester J. Schieber, Investment of Assets in
Self-Directed Retirement Plans, in POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 67, 86 (Michael S. Gordon et al. eds., 1997).
23 Joann S. Lublin, Managers & Managing: As Their Firms Toppled, Some
CEOs Prospered, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Feb. 27, 2002, at A8.
24 See Allan Sloan, One Enron Lesson: Some Insider Trading Falls Outside the
Timely-Reporting Rule, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2002, at E3 (noting that Lay did not
tell employees he had sold significant portions of his own holdings).
25 See id.
26 See Christine Dugas, Don't Bank 401(k) on Employer's Stock: If Company
Hits Bad Spot, Retirement Plan Can Tank, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 2000, at 3B (noting
most companies only provide matching contributions of company stock).
27 See Shlomo Benartzi, Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k)
Accounts to Company Stock, 56 J. FIN. 1747, 1755-61 (2001) (describing how
employees, over-confident about future returns on company stock, tend to over-
invest despite the risks of non-diversification).
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ownership at a number of companies and company stock
comprises a large portion of many employees' retirement
accounts, 401(k) shares ordinarily do not represent a significant
percentage of an employer's outstanding common stock. For
example, at Enron, shares held in 401(k) accounts comprised
only two percent of outstanding stock.28 If company stock held in
the defined-benefit plan and the Enron ESOP 29 were added to
these shares, something on the order of five percent of
outstanding shares were held for the benefit of Enron employees.
Even so, investment of pension assets in company stock will
continue to increase absent restrictive legislation. It is therefore
conceivable that employee ownership at companies like Enron
could reach significant levels in the near future. If stock is
otherwise widely held, even a ten percent block can be powerful
where the owners are able to coordinate their exercise of voting
power. If worker ownership is a desirable objective, company
stock investment in defined-contribution plans should be seen as
an effective way to achieve that goal.
II. THE COSTS OF NON-DIVERSIFICATION
As Enron's share price fell from a high of nearly ninety
dollars to around twenty-five cents, its 401(k) plan-in which
15,000 employees participated-lost 1.3 billion dollars.30  This
disaster was not a unique event. For example, at the time of
Color Tile's bankruptcy in 1997, ninety percent of the value of its
401(k) plan was invested in the company's own stock.31 The
effect was to wipe out virtually all of the employees' pension
savings. Workers at companies where the 401(k) plan is heavily
invested in company stock, such as those mentioned above, 32 face
28 ENRON CORP., SCHEDULE 14A, SECURITY OWNERSHIP OF CERTAIN
BENEFICIAL OWNERS 8 (filed Mar. 27, 2001) (stating that as of February 15, 2001,
Enron's defined-contribution plan held 15,409,696 shares (2.04%) of Enron common
stock), available at http://www.enron.com/corp/investors/.
29 An ESOP ("Employee Stock Ownership Plan") holds common stock of the
employer for the benefit of its employees. See 26 U.S.C. § 4975(e)(7) (2002). As of
December 31, 2000, Enron's ESOP held 17,241,731 shares of Enron common stock.
See ENRON CORP., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 45 (2001), http://www.enron.com/corp/
investors/.
30 Louis Uchitelle, The Rich Are Different: They Know When to Leave, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, § 4, at 1.
31 Lisa Meulbroek, Company Stock in Pension Plans: How Costly Is It? 6 (2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
32 See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
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risk of similar magnitude. While one might insist that
companies as large as those cannot fail, it should be recalled that
Enron, at the time of its collapse, was number seven on the
Fortune 500 list of the largest American companies. 33
A stock price collapse need not be total to have disastrous
consequences. Any substantial decline will be very costly if a
large percentage of 401(k) assets is invested in company stock.
Even at lower percentages, a major drop in market value will be
harmful. At Lucent Technologies, for example, company stock
comprised only thirty percent of 401(k) plan assets, but the value
of that portion of the plan was virtually wiped out when the
value of Lucent stock fell from a high of eighty-two dollars to less
than one dollar.34
Pension savings diversification takes on added importance
when one bears in mind that, for many workers, human capital
investments are firm-specific. For these people, the value of
workplace knowledge, skills, and relationships acquired over
years of service may not be readily transferable to a new
employer. Should their current employer fail, these workers
stand to lose not only the value of company stock invested in
their retirement plans, but also the value of these human capital
investments.
A recent paper attempts to quantify the cost of over-
investment of pension plan assets in company stock. Muelbroek
compares a fully diversified portfolio to one consisting entirely of
a single company's stock.35 The latter is far more subject to firm-
specific risk but offers no corresponding compensation in the
form of higher expected returns. Under reasonable assumptions,
Muelbroek concludes that company stock in a non-diversified
portfolio may actually be worth as little as forty-two percent of
its market value.36
Considering both the irrational propensity of employees to
over-invest in company stock and also the potentially high costs
of such decisions, a strong case is made for legislative restriction
33 See Gretchen Morgenson, How 287 Turned Into 7: Lessons in Fuzzy Math,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, § 3, at 1. Of course, we now know that the numbers on
which Fortune's ranking were based were at best misleading and possibly
fraudulent.
34 Price History of Lucent Technology, at http://www.moneycentral.msn.com/
investor/charts/chartdl.asp?Symbol=Lu (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
35 See generally Meulbroek, supra note 31.
36 See id.
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or even prohibition of 401(k) ownership of company stock. One
bill currently before Congress would limit company stock in an
individual employee's 401(k) account to twenty percent of the
account's market value.37 Another would restrict company stock
to ten percent of that part of an employee's account attributable
to his or her contributions. 38 Academic experts have similarly
advocated legal regulation to prevent over-investment in
company stock. Langbein argues that such holdings should be
limited to ten percent of the value of an individual account, 39
while Stein supports an absolute prohibition.40
The argument for mandatory diversification is even stronger
if one bears in mind that this is not simply a matter of
individuals making choices and then bearing the consequences of
their own mistakes. Inadequate pension income generates social
costs as individuals and private and public organizations are
called upon to take care of retirees who lack the resources to
take care of themselves. Before jumping on the regulatory
bandwagon, however, we should pause to consider whether there
might be countervailing considerations that counsel in favor of
promoting worker ownership through 401(k) plans.
III. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF WORKER OWNERSHIP
A. Self-Realization Through Work
Elster has written about a Marxist conception of work that
rejects the notion of work as disutility and argues instead that
labor can enhance utility by providing a vehicle for self-
realization.41  While the effort involved in work can be
unpleasant, it is also possible for work to provide unique
opportunities for the full development of an individual's interests
and abilities. One condition for self-realization in this sense is a
degree of autonomy or self-determination in the workplace. Self-
37 S. 1838, 107th Cong. (2001).
38 H.R. 3463, 107th Cong. (2001).
39 See The Fall of Enron: How Could it Have Happened?: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 93 (2002) (statement of John H.
Langbein).
40 See Norman Stein, Three and Possibly Four Lessons About ERISA That We
Should, but Probably Will Not, Learn from Enron, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 855 (2002).
41 See generally Jon Elster, Self-Realization in Work and Politics: The Marxist
Conception of the Good Life, in ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITALISM 127 (Jon Elster &
Karl Ove Moene eds., 1989).
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realization is hard to achieve if an employer dictates to workers
the conditions and the end product of the work process. As an
alternative to ownership and control by outside investors, worker
ownership has the potential to facilitate self-determination in
the workplace. Worker ownership therefore can be defended as a
means or even a necessary condition for achievement of self-
realization through work.
401(k) plan participants typically have the right to vote their
shares of company stock.42 This was the case at Enron.
43
Investment of pension savings in company stock therefore can be
a vehicle for participation in control of the business through
election of senior management. Ultimately, voting rights can
mean control of the workplace itself.
Of course, shareholders' voting rights typically do not bring
about effective control over management. At least where
ownership is widely dispersed, the costs of collective action
among shareholders, each holding a tiny fraction of outstanding
stock, are high enough to discourage efforts to organize sizeable
voting blocks. The presence of institutional shareholders may
lower these costs, but institutions are not necessarily interested
in using their voting power to influence the results of annual
elections. 44  The combination of broad dispersion and
institutional passivity typically leaves senior management in
effective control by default.
Worker owners may face lower collective action costs
because they can more readily communicate with each other and
are likely to have a stronger sense of common purpose than do
widely dispersed outside investors. At companies like Enron,
however, the total number of shares owned by employees is not
great enough to amount to significant voting power, even if
workers voted their shares as a single block.
At Enron, worker ownership evidently did not produce a
corporate culture that was conducive to self-realization for most
employees. Instead, at least in the important trading segment of
42 See Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities: More
Is Not Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 69 (1998) ("[I1n defined contribution
plans, voting and tender rights are typically passed through to plan participants.").
43 See ENRON CORP. SAVINGS PLAN, at VIII-2-VIII-3 (1999).
44 See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 452 (1991) (noting that agency problems
deter institutional investors from becoming proactive in the companies whose stock
they hold).
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the business, work was organized as a tournament. Individuals
competed with each other and were rewarded or punished
according to their productivity. This kind of environment, in
which external pressures dictate the pace and goals of work,
probably does not provide an opportunity for personal growth
through self-determination. A minimal condition for self-
realization would appear to be a level of worker ownership
sufficient to establish voting control. Only then would workers
be in a position to create a culture in which self-realization could
flourish.
B. Elimination of Conflict Between Capital and Labor
The possibility that worker ownership can eliminate conflict
between capital and labor could provide a different reason to
encourage worker ownership through 401(k) plans. If workers
themselves provide a company's capital, the inevitable conflicts
between outside investors and their employees might be avoided.
Even if workers do not actually own a controlling interest in
their corporation through their pension plan, lower levels of
stock ownership could still lead employees to think of themselves
as owners rather than employees. If this were so, bargaining
costs and rent seeking might be reduced.
There does not appear to be a point at which stock
ownership necessarily transforms worker attitudes so that a
cooperative outlook replaces an adversarial posture. Even where
workers own a significant percentage of outstanding stock,
conflict between labor and management can persist. This
appears to be the case at United Airlines, for example, where
workers own fifty-five percent of outstanding stock.45 Even
though labor owns a controlling interest, several unions
maintain a strong presence and seem to exhibit the same kind of
confrontational stance toward senior management typically seen
in investor-owned firms.46
The United Airlines example suggests another point. In a
45 Adam Bryant, No Longer Flying in Formation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1997, at
Dl.
46 See Bryant, supra note 45 ("[T]he unions appear to be ignoring
management's warning that letting labor costs creep too high will undo hard-won
gains and damage the carriers' standing on Wall Street."); Edward Wong, United
Air's Family Is Anything But, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, §3, at 1 ("Executives at
United have traditionally blamed... self-serving attitudes of the unions for pushing
the airline's costs sky high.").
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large company, even if worker ownership were to reduce labor-
management conflict substantially, it is still possible that
significant horizontal frictions-among different groups of
workers, such as dissension among pilots, flight attendants,
mechanics, and others-could persist. Unavoidable competition
for firm revenues among such groups encourages costly rent-
seeking activities. Formation of unions may be an example.
Worker ownership, as such, will not resolve these kinds of
conflicts. It could exacerbate them by eliminating the possibility
of a neutral referee capable of moderating such conflicts in a
disinterested manner.
C. Democratic Self-Governance
The political theorist Robert Dahl has emphasized the
connection between worker ownership and democratic self-
governance. 47  Worker ownership allows workers to assert
control over their own workplace, rather than being subject to
the supervision of managers chosen by investor-owners. Self-
government in the workplace can be defended as a good in itself
because it respects the values of "liberty and popular
sovereignty."48  It can also serve the instrumental end of
providing a sort of training ground for active involvement in a
democratic society's political processes. 49
Democratic self-governance in the workplace implies
managerial decision-making power, or at least the power to
choose those who will make management decisions. Ownership
of a minority interest in a firm dominated by outside investors
does not entail these kinds of control. At least at this time,
401(k) plans do not facilitate control because workers do not own
enough stock. Although gradual accumulation of company stock
in individual retirement accounts could eventually result in
significant minority blocks, it is unlikely that such
accumulations could create sufficient voting power to provide
workers with the opportunity to exert meaningful control over
47 See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 94-99 (1985)
("Workplace democracy... will foster human development, enhance the sense of
political efficacy, reduce alienation.... and stimulate greater participation and
better citizenship in the government of the state itself.").
48 SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIs, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM 3 (1986).
49 See DAHL, supra note 47, at 94-98 (recognizing that while many scholars
advocate workplace democracy as a means of inspiring these workers to greater
participation in the political process, in actuality, this does not necessarily occur).
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corporate governance.
Even if workers did enjoy voting power of sufficient
magnitude, self-governance in large corporations is likely to be
representative rather than direct. In a large organization,
democracy modeled on the "New England town meeting" would
surely be an excessively costly distraction from the firm's
primary profit-seeking mission. This would not simply be a
matter of the numbers of people involved. If production were
organized in the form of numerous groups of workers each
performing different functions, competing perspectives and
interests would exacerbate governance costs because of the
likelihood of significant disagreement. Such costs can be high
enough even when numbers are small and everyone is engaged
in essentially the same activity, as in a law partnership or on a
law school faculty.
Because of the significant costs involved in direct democracy,
there will always be pressures for worker-owners in larger firms
to delegate management responsibility to full-time managers so
that the workers can concentrate their energies on production
rather than politics. Election of these managers is still a
democratic exercise, apparently analogous to the democratic
selection of public office-holders. The relationship between
worker-owners and their chosen leaders, however, could be
qualitatively different from the relationship between
governmental officials and their constituents. Having been
chosen to produce economic value, business managers need to
enjoy a reasonably broad range of decision-making authority
that comes at the expense of workers' autonomy. That kind of
relationship-involving significant powers of control-differs
from elected officials' more limited powers over their
constituents. Representative democracy in the workplace, while
still involving self-governance in a meaningful sense,
nevertheless does not amount to a replica of democracy in the
public sphere. Personal autonomy is ceded to a greater degree.
The analogy between workplace and political democracy being
imperfect, the argument for worker ownership based on self-
governance values is not as strong as it might initially appear.
D. Efficiency Considerations
In addition to the arguments sketched above, which are
typically advanced by those on the left side of the political
20021
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spectrum, hard-nosed proponents of productive efficiency have
also pointed to several potential benefits of worker ownership.
For these people, values like individual dignity or self-realization
are not of primary importance. Instead, worker ownership needs
to be evaluated in terms of dollars and cents.
1. Motivation and Productivity
One potential efficiency benefit is the possibility of increased
worker effort resulting from the incentive effects of equity
ownership.50 Non-owner employees are typically compensated by
a fixed wage. Their incentive is to work hard enough to earn the
wage, but no harder. Enhanced productivity resulting from
extra effort would be of no value to the workers because their
return is limited by contract; the extra benefits instead go to the
shareholders as residual claimants. In contrast, if workers
themselves have a stake in the firm's residual income (in effect
claiming returns equivalent to wages plus a share of profits),
they have an incentive to increase their effort levels beyond the
bare minimum necessary to avoid discharge in an investor-
owned company.
Plausible as these ideas might seem, the incentive question
probably is more complex, rendering this argument doubtful at
the theoretical level. Even if workers own stock in their
companies, they must still decide whether increased effort is
worthwhile. In a public company, no single worker's level of
effort (at least no worker below the highest levels of the
managerial hierarchy) makes a difference to the corporation's
bottom line. An individual may wish that everyone else would
work harder and thereby improve corporate performance, but if
that were to happen all shareholders would benefit regardless of
whether they contributed to the improvement. Individual
workers therefore have no reason to increase their own effort.
This would appear to be a classic "free-rider" scenario. 51 In any
50 Because the Bush Administration believes that contributions of company
stock provide a positive incentive to employees, its pension reform proposal does not
include restrictions on the amount of company stock in individual 401(k) accounts.
The proposal would, however, give employees the freedom to sell such shares after
they have participated in the employer's plan for three years. See President George
W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Retirement Savings (Mar. 1, 2002), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020301-2.html.
51 See Joseph Blasi et al., Employee Stock Ownership and Corporate
Performance Among Public Companies, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 60, 61 (1996)
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event, individual ownership stakes are so small that increases in
share price will not significantly increase anyone's personal
wealth.
In contrast, the incentive effects of equity ownership by
high-level management are quite different. These people often
own (or have options to buy) a large enough number of shares.
For them, an increase in stock price can be very valuable. They
are also in a position individually to do things that enhance stock
price.52 These differences can be sufficient to negate the free-
rider tendencies to which lower-level workers are subject.
Turning from theory toward empirical studies, one finds
inconclusive results on the productivity benefits of worker versus
investor ownership. Kruse and Blasi, having surveyed the
research in this area, conclude that "[t]here is no automatic
connection between employee ownership and firm productivity
and profitability .... -53 They also infer from their empirical
work that worker ownership does not necessarily result in better
attitudes, motivation, or behavior in the workplace.54 However,
where motivational improvements are found, "they are almost
always linked to the status of being an employee-owner, and not
to the size of one's ownership stake."55  In such cases,
participation in decision-making seems to be an important
factor. 56
These findings suggest, at best, qualified support for
encouragement of worker ownership through 401(k) plans.
Motivational and productivity gains can follow from worker
ownership even if stakes are small, especially if there is also
meaningful worker participation in workplace decision-making.
Evidently there is more involved here than rational choice theory
(discussing how free-rider problems "among employees limit the incentive effects of
group based reward systems").
52 Recent events, including the Enron scandal itself, indicate that the rewards
of enhanced stock prices are sufficient to induce efforts to boost share value by
illegal, as well as legal, means. See generally David Millon, Why Is Corporate
Management Obsessed With Quarterly Earnings and What Should Be Done About
It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (discussing earnings management
and earnings inflation as mechanisms for boosting share prices artificially).
53 Douglas L. Kruse & Joseph R. Blasi, Employee Ownership, Employee
Attitudes, and Firm Performance: A Review of the Evidence, in HANDBOOK OF
HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 113, 144 (Daniel J.B. Mitchell et al. eds., 1997).
54 See id. at 143.
55 Id.
56 See id.
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alone might predict. At the same time, however, ownership does
not necessarily generate productivity gains, so that argument by
itself is insufficient. Ownership needs to be combined with other
conditions-apparently having to do with workplace culture and
organization-before efficiency increases can be realized.
Looking at Enron, if in fact this was a high motivation, high
productivity workplace, it would appear that factors other than
stock ownership would explain such to be true. A system of well-
defined rewards (compensation and opportunities for promotion)
and punishments (threat of demotion or termination) was
unrelated to stock ownership as such. As workers saw the value
of Enron stock in their 401(k) accounts grow dramatically, this
may have provided them with an additional incentive, but it was
probably not the primary one. More needs to be discovered
about Enron's culture and the attitudes and performance of its
workforce, but Enron's story appears to be consistent with
empirical findings indicating that worker ownership is only one
among a range of factors bearing on worker motivation and
productivity. If so, Enron illustrates the error in simplistic
assumptions about the incentive effects of stock ownership.
2. Trust
The incentive story is complex and ultimately
indeterminate, its relevance apparently dependent on firm-
specific cultural and organizational differences. A second
potential efficiency advantage of worker ownership could be the
potential for reducing employees' distrust of management.
Trust can yield several important benefits, each based on
reduced fear of managerial opportunism. 57 These can include a
greater willingness to link compensation to productivity.
Workers will tend to prefer a fixed wage if they are distrustful of
management but may be willing to accept more flexible
compensation arrangements if they have faith in management's
honesty. 58 In addition, employees who trust management should
be willing to share their own first-hand knowledge about
57 See generally Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 159, 163-64 (1991) (arguing that an ownership interest for workers can reduce
information costs and increase trust, potentially increasing firm productivity).
58 See id. at 200-01 (concluding that a flexible compensation schemes should be
more efficient because it provides the necessary incentives to motivate employees to
work hard).
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potential sources of productivity gains if they have confidence
that management will share these gains with them and will
refrain from using that information to bring about layoffs. 59
Trusting employees should also be more willing to invest in firm-
specific human capital. 60° They may be reluctant to do this if they
fear forfeiture resulting from premature discharge but may
overcome this reluctance if they have faith in management's
good will.
Unlike increased motivation and productivity, which
apparently can result from relatively small ownership stakes if
other factors are present, trust would seem to depend ultimately
on worker control of management. Even well intentioned
managers may be unable to gain employees' trust if they have
been selected by outside investors rather than by the workers
themselves. Workers need assurance that management will act
in their best interests in order for them to overcome their
reluctance to expose themselves to the risk of opportunism. At a
minimum, this should mean shared ownership sufficient to yield
voting control. In a public corporation, this ordinarily means at
least a substantial minority block. And, as noted above, even
majority ownership will not necessarily eliminate conflict
between labor and management.61
The typical 401(k) plan does not include nearly enough
company stock to confer voting control on workers. Certainly
this was the case at Enron. Worker ownership through 401(k)
plans, therefore, is not a realistic vehicle for promoting trust
between workers and management.
3. Governance Savings
Worker ownership has the potential to reduce agency and
monitoring costs. Agency costs arise whenever a principal hires
an agent to act on his or her behalf. An agent will not work as
hard for the principal as the principal would because the agent
does not fully realize the gains resulting from his or her efforts.
The principal can monitor the agent's performance but this is
costly. In addition, at some point the marginal cost of
monitoring exceeds the marginal benefit; the agent therefore will
retain some measure of freedom to shirk his or her
59 See id. at 200.
60 See id. at 201.
61 See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
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responsibilities. 62
In the typical investor-owned firm, there are two layers of
agency costs, as investors hire managers to monitor workers.
Worker ownership has the potential to eliminate both layers.63
If workers can monitor each other's performance, no agents need
be involved and associated costs can be eliminated. Savings can
also flow from the fact that workers may be better positioned
than supervisors to keep track of their fellow workers' efforts.
They also have a stronger incentive to be attentive because the
resulting savings redound to their own benefit.
Worker self-governance presumably requires voting control.
If instead control resides with outside investors, they will insist
on hiring managers who will manage in their interest. They
cannot leave management responsibility in the hands of the
workers because, as fixed rather than residual claimants,
employees will make decisions with an eye toward generating
revenues' sufficient to pay themselves rather than seeking to
maximize return on the firm's assets. To protect their interests,
investors therefore must rely on agents.
Even if workers own enough stock to constitute voting
control, if the firm is reasonably large, they may find that it
makes no economic sense to attempt to manage it themselves.
The costs of self-governance may be excessive. 64 These costs can
include both the time and energy involved in reaching agreement
about policy matters and also the cost of measuring and
evaluating implementation of those decisions. 65 Accordingly,
worker-owners may choose to reduce these costs by hiring
managers, even though that decision involves costs of its own,
including compensation and monitoring expenses as well as the
unavoidable costs of sub-optimal performance. Like investor-
owners, workers may find that they can use their time more
62 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976).
63 See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (suggesting that
worker ownership can be a response to monitoring difficulties).
64 See Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law
Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 178-82
(1990) (discussing various governance costs, including vast amounts of time and
effort).
65 See id. at 1781.
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profitably by doing things other than attempting to manage the
firm, namely producing goods or services for sale.
Significant governance cost savings :by means of worker
ownership probably are realizable only at relatively small
companies. In large companies like Enron, 401(k) plans do not
own enough company stock to provide workers with the control
necessary to establish self-governance. Even if they did, it is
likely that worker-owners would need to rely on agents just as
investor-owners do. Savings in governance costs therefore do not
justify promotion of worker ownership through 401(k) plans.
CONCLUSION
Enron graphically illustrates the risks workers face when
they over-invest their pension savings in their company's stock.
Having already invested their firm-specific human capital in
their employer, they increase the costs of firm failure to the
extent they fail to diversify their 401(k) investments. These
considerations provide ample reason for the legislatively
mandated diversification that Congress is considering. Before
endorsing the wisdom of such reforms, however, some attention
to another aspect of this issue seems appropriate. Because of the
proliferation of tax-advantaged 401(k) retirement plans and the
absence of limits on investment in company stock, the 401(k)
plan represents the most convenient and economically attractive
means for workers to participate in the ownership of their own
companies. A range of arguments has been advanced in favor of
worker ownership, from the left as well as the right sides of the
political spectrum. These include promotion of individual self-
realization and democratic decision-making in the workplace,
reduction of labor-management conflict, and several potential
efficiency benefits. Examined in the context of Enron, it turns
out that none of these arguments amounts to a compelling
reason for encouraging worker investment in company stock.
The case for mandatory diversification therefore is strong.
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